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INTRODUCTION: AN UNSPEAKABLE MOMENT 
27 
The importance of self-narrative has been emphasised not only in therapeutic practice, 
but also educational theory and practice. In the age of the end of 'grand narratives', it 
is said that only 'small narratives' are possible. On this point, autobiography has been 
in the spotlight in myriad educational contexts. However, if we place too much 
emphasis on the importance of self-narrative, the individual will be understood only 
in terms of autonomy, or in other words our presumption of the individual as self-
directed and responsible for his or her actions. From this point of view, we tend to see 
the individual as a volitional subject who can fully express herself. It seems that this 
view misses the involuntary aspect of the individual in expressing 'herself'. 
Regarding this point I would like to offer one example. An elementary school 
teacher once lamented that he had no words to explain why art classes, such as music, 
drawing and manual arts, are useful for children. For parents who see the learning 
process as a preparation for securing their children's future condition, the art classes 
seem to be a 'waste of time'. This shows the same problem described above from 
another angle. There is a tendency to think that learning is valuable only if it has an 
exact aim that enables the individual to be an autonomous self. This amounts to a 
diminishing and reduction of learning. 
When it comes to examining what is happening in learning, asking 'what is the 
aim?' is problematic, for if we place too much emphasis on the outcome of learning, 
an accident or a chance event occurring in educational practice can be missed. This 
chance event might remain 'unspeakable' if we remain guided by the question of what 
the aim is, like the elementary school teacher mentioned above. Such an accident can 
be understood as an a-teleological moment of learning. This moment presents us with 
new meanings of our lives and our world. To better understand the a-teleological 
moment of learning, I want to ask the following question: What is happening in the 
moment of learning? To answer this question, this paper examines Walter Benjamin's 
theory of language in order to bring to light the a-teleological aspect of the moment of 
learning and writing that is deeply related to opening new possibilities or meanings of 
the self and the world. 
Benjamin (1892-1940) developed his unique thought in the critical epoch when 
the world was suffering from horribly destructive world wars. It is well-known that he 
diagnosed his age as the age of the 'poverty of experience' because of collapsed 
traditions or customs (Benjamin, 1933a, pp. 731-736). This diagnosis urged Benjamin 
to explore how people can speak the unspeakable: what has been forgotten, what has 
not been yet and what is unmemorable. The unspeakable that Benjamin concerned 
with is the nature of the moment of the chance event, which is inevitably occurring 
without language of human being, but it does not mean that there is something we 
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cannot say in our language but the conflict of the speakable and unspeakable makes 
language possible as we will see in the following sections. In this sense, the 
unspeakable can only appear in our writing for the first time. Although Benjamin 
claims that we cannot communicate our experience, he is deeply concerned with the 
idea that we could somehow write ourselves in ways that are inspired by the not-I-
namely a sort of otherness to ourselves. This essay will show the inseparability of the 
unspeakable (otherness) and writing, and how the experience of writing involves an 
unceasing transformation of one's self because learning is a kind of transformation of 
the self. 
The aim of this paper is to examine the ideas of experience and writing in 
Benjamin's thought, especially his allusion to the event that we cannot fully 
understand. 1 This paper also explores the nature of writing, understood as distinct 
from sentimental reminiscence driven by the modem tendency of resentment or 
reinforcement of our autonomous selves. According to Benjamin, the experience of 
writing cannot be separated from a chance event. This is related to the a-teleological 
aspect of learning. The first section will look at Benjamin's early theory of language. 
'ON LANGUAGE AS SUCH AND ON THE LANGUAGE OF MAN' 
For understanding Benjamin's theory of language, 'On Language as Such and on the 
Language of Man' (1916) is the most influential text, and focuses on the theological 
aspect of language. Gilloch characterises Benjamin's understanding of language as 
follows: 'Benjamin rejects the view of language as a mere instrument of 
communication and arbitrary sign system, on the grounds that it is predicated on an 
inadequate and impoverished conception of human experience' (Gilloch, 2002, p. 61). 
Based on this understanding of language, Benjamin sees language in terms of a 
conflict of the expressed (speakable) and unexpressed (unspeakable). Benjamin thus 
explains this conflict: 
Within all linguistic formation a conflict is waged between what is expressed and 
expressible and what is inexpressible and unexpressed. On considering this 
conflict, one sees at the same time, from the perspective of the inexpressible, the 
last mental entity. Now, it is clear that in the equation of mental and linguistic 
being, the notion of an inverse proportionality between the two is disputed. For ... 
the deeper (that is, the more existent and real) the mind, the more it is expressible 
and expressed (Benjamin, 1916, pp. 66-67). 
According to Gilloch, Benjamin criticises Martin Buber's 'theological conception of 
the fundamental inexpressibility of the most profound and privileged forms of human 
experience', which is characterised as an 'intuitive experience of mystical insight' 
(ibid.). For Buber, God is the absolute Other, thus it is impossible for humans to 
express the mystery of God (i. e. revelation). Although Benjamin has a theological 
view of language, unlike Buber he rejects the inexpressibility of the mystery that 
enriches the depth of human experience. In other words, he avoids substantialising the 
moment in which God and humans are unified into the oneness that repels the 
language of man. He, however, still sees language in terms of the conflict of 
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speakable and unspeakable. This conflict should not be dissolved; rather, this is what 
makes language possible. In this sense, Benjamin is concerned with 'the 
expressionless' (Benjamin, 1921122, p. 340), which brings a difference (or new 
meaning) for human expression, i. e. writing. 
'ON THE MIMETIC FACULTY' 
In 1933 Benjamin developed a new language theory, provoked by the anthropological 
studies of primitive societies, Freud's psychoanalysis, graphology, and phrenology. In 
'On the Mimetic Faculty' Benjamin is deeply concerned with 'the mimetic gift 
(faculty)' that human beings possess (Benjamin, 1933b, pp. 720-722). In general, 
mimesis is understood as imitation. But Benjamin's understanding of this concept is 
richer than mere copying. This gift enables us to connect to the world that expresses 
the mystery of the universe. Benjamin shows us how this human mimetic gift is 
related to language and writing. It is possible to say that writing itself is mimesis. 
In this section, I scrutinize an experience of writing in relation to the mimesis of 
the event (otherness), in light of Benjamin's thought. According to Benjamin, the 
experience of writing cannot be separated from an event that we cannot recognise 
consciously. This is related to the a-teleological aspect of learning. I would like to 
consider an experience of writing in terms of mimesis and forge a connection between 
Benjamin's theological and mimetic theories of language. 
According to Benjamin, there are two kinds of mimesis: 
Nature produces similarities; one need only think of Ill1Ill1cry. The highest 
capacity for producing similarities, however, is man's. His gift for seeing 
similarity is nothing but a rudiment of the once powerful compulsion to become 
similar and to behave mimetically. There is perhaps not a single one of this higher 
functions in which his mimetic faculty does not playa decisive role (p. 720). 
These two kinds of mimetic momentum are 'the gift for seeing similarities' and 
'the gift for producing similarities'. The former is the 'event' or the moment that 
occurs a-teleologically. The latter is a way of writing that makes connections between 
the un-connectable. This means to bring something invisible or elusiveness into forms 
in human body or its movement, for instance writing. Reconsidering mimesis in terms 
of the event and writing, we can see the involuntary aspect of writing that inspires us 
to realize the a-teleological elusive event. This event drives writing and generates new 
possibilities in our lives. 
The event in which'!, become similar to something other than 'me' (not-I) is 
mimesis in terms of 'the gift for seeing similarities'. In this event, the boundary of the 
world and the self vanishes. This event cannot be captured by our consciousness (i. e. 
the self) and is unspeakable because what is captured by our consciousness is 
necessarily different from this event. In this sense, mimesis as 'the gift for seeing 
similarities' is always already occurring before we ask about the aim of imitation, or 
even what the aim of learning is. Mimesis inevitably occurs without any intention or 
ends. This event can be given a shape (or expression) only when 'the gift for 
producing similarities' makes a connection between something un-connectable in 
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writing. The reason 'the gift for producing similarities' is characterised as making a 
connection between the un-connectable in writing and is necessarily different from 
the event is because the event has no boundary or shape in itself-that is to say it 
always exceeds 'the gift for producing similarities'. This unspeakable event can only 
appear in the moment of writing. To be precise, the event in which the boundary of 
the world and the self vanishes cannot previously exist for writing. In this sense these 
two momentums of mimesis are inseparable. 
In 'On Language as Such and on the Language of Man' , Benjamin claims that the 
conflict of the speakable and unspeakable makes language possible (Benjamin, 1916, 
p. 74). Now, this conflict can be translated into the inseparability of the event and 
writing. The event (unspeakable) can be expressed as a difference in writing. This 
difference drives writing as a form of mimesis that produces similarities. This means 
that the event and writing are not the same but they are inseparable and generate a 
new meaning. The event as mimesis occurs involuntarily in a moment of which we 
cannot be conscious, and writing as mimesis brings this event in an experience as a 
difference. Learning driven by mimesis needs t~ be understood in terms of chance or 
accident, in Benjamin's view. In this sense, learning is not only a volitional action but 
also an involuntary event occurring by chance. This kind of event is always already 
happening in learning. 
CONCLUSION: AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPT OF THE SELF 
This paper has sought an a-teleological aspect of the moment of learning and writing, 
resisting the understanding of learning in terms of what has an exact aim and what 
enables the individual to be an autonomous self. In light of Benjamin's language 
theory, it becomes possible to see an experience of writing in terms of inseparability 
of the event (unspeakable) and writing (speakable). The expression is always driven 
by the expressionless and expressed as a difference. This means that though Benjamin 
never sees the oneness of the self and the world, he tries to seek an alternative way to 
narrate the self or an alternative concept of the self that is viewed not from the self but 
from the experience. As I have explained, Benjamin points out the impossibility of the 
communication of experience in our modem age. But his claim rather could be 
understood as the necessity of the alternative concept of experience. Agamben 
characterises Benjamin's experience as 'a new concept of experience, freed from the 
subject's condition' (Agamben, 1978, p. 56). Jay also conceives of Benjamin's 
experience as 'experience without a subject' (Jay, 1998, p. 205). This paper seeks to 
explain this understanding of the concept of experience in the light of Benjamin's 
theory of language, and hence seeks an alternative concept of the self. 
In this respect I want to point out the importance of Benjamin's notion that the 
moment of learning is a 'tiger-jump' that transforms both the self and the world, 
because the experience of writing is driven by something we cannot control 
arbitrarily. Learning is transformation-namely, opening a new meaning of the world. 
We cannot fully describe what is happening in the moment that what we call 
'learning' occurs because learning is driven by the chance event. The chance event is 
the unspeakable that is always and already occurring but easily missed in educational 
practice which strongly districted by the curriculum and the certain aims. In this 
paper, I tried to subvert the tendency prevailing view of educational practice through 
the language theory of Benjamin. If we want to think about the a-teleological moment 
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of learning being driven by the unspeakable, it does not help to ask what the aim of 
learning is. Rather, we need to keep trying to describe what is happening in the very 
moment of learning in our writings. 
NOTES 
This event means something happening without being planned or intention and is always and 
already happening; the event is unspeakable that I try to scrutinise in this paper. 
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